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WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PROGRESS TO TRANSFORMATION 
An Intersectional Response to Nussbaum  
 
Shreya Atrey* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article asks ‘the intersectional question’ about women’s progress. The purpose is to 
understand whether the successes of the women’s movement and women’s human rights have 
improved the conditions of women who are disadvantaged not only because of their sex or 
gender but also disadvantaged by their race, colour, caste, religion, region, disability, age, 
sexual orientation, etc. It takes its cue from an account of the matter laid out by Martha 
Nussbaum. I contend that Nussbaum’s view of women’s progress, especially under CEDAW, 
does not consider the substantive and strategic implications of intersectionality and thus is not 
transformative in nature. The central argument then espouses a normative vision of women’s 
progress which is intersectional such that it reflects and improves the lives of all women in 
the specific ways in which they are affected by multiple and overlapping systems of 
disadvantage and in turn subverts and transforms these systems.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Kimberlé Crenshaw’s seminal article which coined the term ‘intersectionality’, she 
imagines discrimination as a basement.1 The basement consists of stacks of people 
standing feet on shoulders. At the bottom are those who are disadvantaged in all 
possible ways on the basis of their race, sex, gender, class, caste, religion, sexual 
orientation, disability, age, marital status, etc; while those who were disadvantaged by 
a single characteristic alone inhabit the ceiling. Above the ceiling is the floor on 
which everyone who is not disadvantaged in any way resides. Crenshaw argues that 
when a hatch is developed for the disadvantaged people in the basement to escape to 
the floor above, it is generally those who lie just below the floor and on top of the 
basement who break free. Thus, the hatch allows only those who are singularly 
burdened to leave the basement of discrimination, unless those who are multiply-
burdened ‘can somehow pull themselves into the groups that are permitted to squeeze 
through the hatch.’2 
 The metaphor exemplifies the condition of women. The basement consists of 
all the women disadvantaged not only on the basis of their sex or gender but also 
because they are disabled, gay, poor, minor, single, old etc and belong to a minority 
race, religion, or caste in a particular context. At the top are women who are 
privileged in every way except for their sex or gender. On an international plane, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) provides the hatch for women to escape the basement. 3  Women’s 
transition to the floor above—which brings them on par with men—marks the 
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progress in the movement for women’s equality and human rights. Yet, because 
inequality is arranged in a disparate and hierarchical fashion, it is often not easy for 
women at the bottom (who are multiply disadvantaged, say as poor disabled Black 
lesbians) to be able to progress just as easily as women at the top (who are 
disadvantaged only because they are women, like non-disabled white heterosexual 
middle-class women).  
 What does this mean for the success of the hatch? One way to see it is that, 
while progress can be traced for every woman who crosses over to the other side, it 
remains partial and not entirely transformative when others remain consigned to the 
basement. But given that the hatch is nevertheless available, women at the bottom too, 
may occasionally and bravely, pull themselves through it. Unlike the progress in the 
first case, their transition is complete and transformative. It is complete because it 
includes not only women who are relatively privileged but also those at the bottom of 
the hierarchy. Consequently, it is transformative in that it transforms the basement or 
structures which are organised to trap women who are severally and severely 
disadvantaged. Thus, if a mere upward progression from the basement is one-
dimensional, transformation is intersectional so to say. The success of the women’s 
movement and women’s human rights, lies in not just devising a hatch and letting 
some escape through it, but making such progress transformative in terms of uplifting 
all women through the hatch, including those who suffer from the worst forms of 
intersectional disadvantage, and in the process, dismantling the structures and 
relationships of power which create such disadvantage.   
 What has CEDAW achieved in this regard? This article considers this 
question. It does so in response to a seminal account of the matter laid out by Martha 
Nussbaum in her 2016 article ‘Women’s Progress and Women’s Human Rights.’4 
Drawing on examples which underline the social, political, and legal implications of 
CEDAW, Nussbaum argues that CEDAW has played a small, but not so insignificant, 
role in strengthening women’s movement and women’s human rights. Nussbaum 
delineates two such contributions. First, the social and political importance of 
CEDAW in supporting the international women’s movement in developing ‘a sense 
of common purpose, a common language, [and] a common set of demands’.5 Second, 
the ‘real, if limited, legal significance’ of CEDAW when it is invoked by friendly 
jurists around the world. Thus, Nussbaum argues that ‘the influence of international 
human rights ought to be assessed, often at least, in this broader way, looking at the 
role of the documents [like CEDAW] in political and social movements.’6  
 This is all too brief a summary of Nussbaum’s extensive account of CEDAW 
in the women’s movement. Nussbaum’s detailing, which cannot with any sincerity be 
reproduced here, is rich and revealing. She gives numerous and varied examples for 
her claims, provides pointed statistics, refers to myriad contexts (USA, Italy, New 
Zealand, India, and Botswana), and presents her conclusions in a broad light. In the 
rest of the article, I deal with her finer points at appropriate places. But in order to 
make sense of the whole and to understand where the present critique comes from, let 
us, for a moment, return to the basement metaphor. Nussbaum’s article provides an 
illuminating account of the ceiling, i.e. women’s disadvantage based on sex or gender, 
the development of the hatch of CEDAW, and the use of the hatch for progressing 
from the ceiling to the floor above, where everyone enjoys equality and human rights. 
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But she misses the whole picture in failing to consider the rest of the basement which 
consists of women who are multiply disadvantaged, i.e. women who are not just 
disadvantaged because they are women but also because they are poor, disabled, gay, 
aged, young, Black/Dalit/Roma/Muslim, etc. Their intersectional disadvantage 
complicates the view of the progress made by those already at the ceiling; such that 
their inclusion transforms women’s inequality, while their exclusion diminishes the 
gains made. 
 This article takes a cue from Nussbaum’s assessment, especially the examples 
she uses, to ask ‘the intersectional question’ about women’s progress and women’s 
human rights. It challenges Nussbaum’s evidence in support of her final conclusion 
because it does not account for the way women’s inequality is actually organised—in 
the scheme of the basement metaphor—intersectionally. If one considers the 
intersectional implications of the examples Nussbaum cites to make her central 
claims, a different reality emerges. Thus, applying a Dalit feminist perspective to 
CEDAW’s contribution to the transnational women’s movement, it appears that 
CEDAW was influential not (only) because it provided a ‘common’ purpose, 
language or set of demands but quite the contrary—it was the intersectional space 
provided by CEDAW to women’s movements to articulate not just their 
commonalities but their differences which made CEDAW so important and in fact, 
transformative. 7  The movement thus strengthened not because but inspite of the 
rhetoric of commonness, and instead, for its appreciation of commonalities and 
differences in the same breath. On the other hand, the example of Dalit women also 
makes clear that CEDAW’s legal significance when applied directly by justices, such 
as in India, is partial at best. The erasure of caste and class injustices from the 
assessment of cases of sexual violence against women (which were nevertheless 
progressive), represents a form of progress which is far from transformative. This is 
true of the Indian Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Vishaka v State of 
Rajasthan8 which is cited by Nussbaum as the hallmark of the direct effect CEDAW 
can have in municipal law. But in fact, in addressing mainly the condition of upper-
caste middle-class women, and leaving intact the position of subordination of poor 
Dalit women, Vishaka may be considered less effective in its enforcement of 
CEDAW than Nussbaum believes. A fuller consideration of the instances of 
invocation of CEDAW in India reveals fortuitous successes, missed opportunities, 
and even glaring oversights which complicate our view of the direct enforcement of 
CEDAW at the national level. So in the final analysis, though much like Nussbaum, I 
underwrite the modest success of CEDAW in supporting and fortifying the women’s 
movement and progress, I do so for reasons quite different from those of Nussbaum. 
My argument is that intersectionality modifies our understanding of progress, such 
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feminism in Uma Chakravarti, Gendering Caste: Through a Feminist Lens (Stree 2009); Anupama Rao 
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8 Vishaka v State of Rajasthan 1997 AIR 3011 (Supreme Court of India). 
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that progress which is transformative in nature takes into account the situation of 
intersectional groups, while progress which does not consider the impact on 
intersectional groups is, at best, a qualified one. While CEDAW seems to have moved 
in both the directions, its jurisprudence and influence has been increasingly and 
decidedly intersectional in the course of its development over the last four decades. It 
is this inclusive and hence transformative progress which makes CEDAW so relevant.  
 These are the specific and contrary claims I make in arriving at, what is 
ultimately, a shared conclusion with Nussbaum. The retelling of CEDAW’s impact 
story matters for several reasons. First and foremost, it matters in an epistemic sense 
for us to know why CEDAW may have succeeded. Here my reasoning differs from 
Nussbaum’s in a fundamental way. Nussbaum either disconsiders intersectionality or 
considers it, especially in relation to sexuality and caste, wilfully set aside 
‘strategically’, though she agrees, ‘at a cost’.9 Instead, I consider for substantive and 
strategic reasons that intersectionality is inescapable both in the women’s movement 
and in CEDAW. That is, intersectionality is central to our understanding of what 
women’s inequality and denial of human rights looks like and is thus being 
conceptually and strategically embraced in the women’s movement and CEDAW 
alike; its reckoning contributing to their successes and its denial contributing to their 
failures. Second, this epistemic point can be appreciated only when the ontological 
reality of intersectional disadvantage suffered by women not only as women is 
appreciated. This requires engagement with the subaltern experiences that are 
ordinarily disguised or in conflict with the ‘mainstream’ account of women’s human 
rights. In offering such an engagement from a Dalit feminist perspective, the aim, as 
Susie Tharu and Tejaswini Niranjana argue, ‘is to initiate a polemic that will render 
visible the points of collision and the lines of force that have hitherto remained 
subterranean, and construct instruments that will enable struggles on this reconfigured 
ground.’10 The article considers CEDAW as an instrument or hatch which allows 
women’s struggles to unfold and succeed on this reconfigured ground made of 
subaltern/subterranean/Dalit feminist/intersectional perspectives. Third, this in turn is 
possible when women’s struggle and CEDAW is looked at in context. Inspite of the 
shared experience of women’s disadvantage around the world, specific forms of sex 
discrimination both further illuminate the shared experience, and at the same time, 
diversity it. Context then deepens our discussions of transnational movements and 
international instruments by embedding them in local and specific experiences.11 In 
this, I follow Susanne Zwingel, who gauges CEDAW’s impact by focussing ‘on 
creating and maintaining connections and takes interest in micro-level processes 
rather than identifying large-scale causal patterns. This perspective helps to develop a 
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de-centered and de-essentializing vision of global norms.’12 Maitrayee Chaudhuri also 
remarks that, ‘[t]he context, within which concepts emerge and the contexts where 
they travel to, needs enunciation. Its significance in an increasingly globalized 
academia cannot be overstated. Hence the focus here is on both the tale and [its] 
telling.’13 Taking a cue from Chaudhuri, I transpose CEDAW from its ‘Western’ 
origins to a context it has travelled to: of Indian women’s movement and law.14 While 
Nussbaum uses the United States as her interlocutor in examining CEDAW and 
international women’s movement’s broader significance (even though the US is not a 
party to CEDAW), I employ India and its rich engagement with CEDAW and 
women’s movement abroad to reflect on both their direct and indirect impact. Thus, in 
contrast with Nussbaum’s ‘broader way, looking at the role of the documents [like 
CEDAW] in political and social movements,’15 the article zooms in on particularized 
protectorates, contexts, and forms of analyses including intersectional, postcolonial, 
third world, and Dalit feminism, which ultimately not only changes the telling of the 
tale, but the tale itself.  
 The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains what is meant by an 
intersectional view of progress (2.1), why it matters for transformative purposes (2.2), 
and to what extent CEDAW embraces the notions of intersectionality and 
transformation (2.3). Section 3 tackles Nussbaum’s claim about the success of the 
direct enforcement of CEDAW from a Dalit feminist perspective. It responds to 
Nussbaum’s specific claim about the direct effect of CEDAW by telling a different, 
more sober, story about the ‘success’ of CEDAW in cases like Vishaka and 
corroborating this account with the disjunct judicial interpretations of CEDAW at the 
municipal level. In particular it critiques the direct enforcement of CEDAW in 
Vishaka for failing to appreciate the nature of violence against Dalit women (3.1); and 
takes a comprehensive look at the way CEDAW has been invoked domestically by 
the Indian Supreme Court (3.2). Section 4 describes the ways in which CEDAW has 
turned its cases of limitations into spaces of possibilities, especially in enabling 
intersectional groups within the women’s movement. It has thus supplanted its 
rhetoric of commonness with differences amongst women, allowing movements like 
the Dalit feminism to engage with the transnational women’s movement in the 
backdrop of CEDAW (4.1); and has even addressed acute and specific issues 
concerning women, viz. abortion, contraception, and sexuality, through targeted 
intervention (4.2). Section 5 concludes with joining Nussbaum in her central 
hypothesis about the significance of CEDAW. It closes by reiterating that our 
                                                 
12 Susanne Zwingel, Translating International Women’s Rights: THE CEDAW Convention in Context 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2016) 8.  
13 Maitrayee Chaudhuri, ‘Feminism in India: The Tale and Its Telling’ (2012) 209 Revue Tiers Monde 
19, 35 (emphasis in original). 
14 As Chandra Talpade Mohanty points out sharply: ‘it is both to the explanatory potential of particular 
analytic strategies employed by such writing [generalising on women], and to their political effect in 
the context of the hegemony of Western scholarship, that I want to draw attention here...Western 
feminist writing on women in the third world must be considered in the context of the global hegemony 
of Western scholarship-i.e., the production, publication, distribution and consumption of information 
and ideas. Marginal or not, this writing has political effects and implications beyond the immediate 
feminist or disciplinary audience. One such significant effect of the dominant “representations” of 
Western feminism is its conflation with imperialism in the eyes of particular third world women. Hence 
the urgent need to examine the political implications of analytic strategies and principles.’ Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses’ (1984) 12 
boundary 2: On Humanism and the University I: The Discourse of Humanism 333, 334 (emphasis in 
original, citations omitted). 
15 Nussbaum (n 4) 594. 
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interpretation of the impact of international instruments like CEDAW must be 
intersectional in order to gauge whether women’s progress is transformative.   
 
2. An Intersectional View of Progress 
  
 2.1 Why Intersectionality?  
 
Nussbaum opens the article with a proclamation: ‘Women are making progress.’16 
She cites impressive data in this regard. 17  Every country in the world has given 
women the right to vote. The number of female legislators in national parliaments has 
nearly doubled in the last thirty years. Women’s enrolment in primary and secondary 
education is now on par with men. Women are working for gainful employment far 
more than before and women’s poverty is decreasing around that world. Women’s 
health has also improved; life expectancy at birth has increased by about twenty years 
in the last six decades. Even in the most recalcitrant areas, ‘there is an emerging 
international consensus that [for example] violence against women ought to be taken 
more seriously.’18  
 Nussbaum’s observations are incontrovertible. Women indeed are making 
progress. Consolidated statistics from around the world confirm Nussbaum’s sense of 
women’s progress. Even in India, the world’s most populous democracy with 1.3 
billion people, women have made tremendous strides.19 Women not only achieved the 
right to vote at the same time as men in 1950 when independent India’s Constitution 
was adopted, they are now voting almost on par with men.20 The number of female 
legislators, though still very low, has shown upward progression with women taking 
up 66 of the 543 elected seats in the Parliament, the highest ever in the history of the 
country. 21  The female literacy rate at 65.46 percent, while well below the world 
average of 79.7 percent, has increased faster (11.8 percent) than that of men (6.9 
percent) in the 2001-2011 decanal period 22  and has steadily improved since the 
abysmal 8.86 percent recorded during the first census in 1951.23 Maternal mortality 
rate has declined faster than the global target24 and life expectancy has improved 
                                                 
16 ibid 590. 
17 ibid 590-591. 
18 ibid 592. 
19 Though it must be noted that despite being the most populous democracy, India’s sex ration has not 
improved and has even dropped since independence with the census in 2001 yielding the figure of 933 
women per 1000 men as compared to the 1951 census figure of 946 per 1000 men. See ‘Sex 
Composition of the Population’ (2001) Census of India < 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Library/Provisional_Population_Total_link/PDF_Links/chapte
r6.pdf> (accessed 10 October 2017). 
20 In the last national (general) election in 2014, men voted at 67 percent while women at 66 percent. 
Rajeshwari Deshpande, ‘Women’s Vote in 2014’ (25 June 2014) The Hindu 
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/womens-vote-in-2014/article6151723.ece> (accessed 11 
September 2017). 
21 ‘Profile of the 16th Lok Sabha’ <http://www.prsindia.org/media/media-updates/profile-of-the-16th-
lok-sabha-3276/> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
22 ‘Women’s Education in India: How Serious are we Really?’ (13 October 2015) Women’s Web 
<http://www.womensweb.in/2015/10/women-education-in-india/> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
23 ‘Literacy in India: Steady March over the Years’ (6 September 2003) Ministry of Human Resource 
Development <http://pib.nic.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/rsep2003/06092003/r060920031.html> 
(accessed 11 September 2017). 
24 Rhythma Kaul, ‘India’s Maternal Mortality Rate on a Decline’ (27 May 2017) The Hindustan Times 
<http://www.hindustantimes.com/health/india-s-maternal-mortality-rate-on-a-decline/story-
ZcnBG0kidtvPEkRnKNI0II.html> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
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vastly. 25  Though women’s labour force participation in India has declined to be 
amongst the lowest in the world, there are some efforts to recognise women’s labour 
at home and in informal occupations.26 Similarly, although sexual violence has been 
depressingly persistent, the outrage against it has categorically intensified.27 
 These statistics are clear in two respects—first, women have made progress 
comparatively vis-à-vis men; and second, women have made progress in a temporal 
sense, as against the condition of women in the preceding decades. These statistics 
though do not tell us whether women have made progress in an intersectional sense, 
i.e. across women and as a whole. This begs the question whether all women have 
progressed? Who made progress and who was left out? Disaggregating women’s 
statistics helps understand progress further. 
 Take for example the case of 100 million Dalit women, who constitute a fifth 
of about 500 million women in India. 28  Of the 66 women elected to the 16th 
Parliament (Lok Sabha), 11 are Dalit. 29  But this political participation does not 
squarely translate into socio-economic advancement of Dalit women in general.30 
Over 70 percent of Dalit women remain illiterate and live in rural India.31 52 percent 
of Dalit women earn their livelihood as agricultural wage labourers as compared to 17 
percent of upper-caste women.32 In terms their daily wages, Dalit women average at 
37INR per day (approx. 0.55USD) as compared to 56INR (approx. 0.85USD) earned 
by upper-caste women and the national average of 42INR (approx. 0.65USD).33 As a 
result, over 30 percent of Dalit women live in extreme poverty as compared to 11 
percent upper-caste women. The mortality rate of Dalit women is 39.5 years, which is 
14.6 years less than that of upper-caste women (54.1 years).34 Even sexual violence, 
although universally difficult and specifically so in India, becomes far worse in 
relation to Dalit women. Dalit women remain thrice as likely to face sexual violence 
on the basis of their caste, class, and gender, and rarely if ever report such violations 
                                                 
25 R Prasad, ‘Increase in Life Expectancy more in Women in India’ (18 December 2014) The Hindu 
<http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/health/increase-in-life-expectancy-more-in-women-in-
india/article6701372.ece> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
26 See Urmila Chatterjee, Rinku Murgai and Martin Rama (2015), ‘Job Opportunities along the Rural-
Urban Gradation and Female Labor Force Participation in India’, Policy Research Working Paper 
7412, World Bank. 
27 Though the outrage, as I also point out later, is selective, and seldom expressed beyond class and 
caste lines. See Kalpana Sharma, ‘Is Violence the New Normal’ (5 December 2015) 
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Kalpana_Sharma/kalpana-sharma-asks-if-violence-
against-women-is-the-new-normal/article7948830.ece> (accessed 10 October 2014); Ratna Kapur, 
‘Normalising Sexual Violence’ (5 June 2014) The Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-
ed/normalising-sexual-violence/article6082831.ece> (accessed 10 October 2014).  
28 See the website of the Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India for gender 
composition recorded in the last census in 2011 
<http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/gender_composition.aspx> (last accessed 2 October 
2017). 
29 Nidhi Sadana Sabharwal and Wandana Sonalkar, ‘Dalit Women in India: At the Crossroads of 
Gender, Class, and Caste’ (2015) 8 Global Justice 44, 61.  
30 In fact, Dalits are peculiar in that they have amassed vast political power especially in some large 
and prominent states like Uttar Pradesh in India despite being one of the most disadvantaged and 
discriminated social groups. See Sudha Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution 
(Sage 2002). 
31 ‘Now we are Fearless: Facts about Dalit Women’ 
<http://www.overcomingviolence.org/en/resources/campaigns/women-against-violence/now-we-are-
fearless/dalit-fact-sheet.html> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
32 Sabharwal and Sonalkar (n 29) 53.  
33 ibid 54. 
34 ibid 63. 
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or are served justice when they do.35 Only 1 percent of rape cases reported by Dalit 
women ever end up in convictions as compared to 25 percent of rapes reported by 
upper-caste women.36 Even temporally, these statistics are not ones of progress but 
signify historical and abiding patterns of discrimination and violations of human 
rights.37 Dalit women’s suffering continues unabated, as against men, other (upper-
caste middle-class) women, and even as against the passage of time.  
 The condition of Dalit women puts a dent in our confidence over women’s 
progress. The condition of other intersectional groups of women unsettles us further. 
For example, Black women, disabled women, indigenous women, Roma women, and 
bisexual, transgender and lesbian women, all face far greater risk of sexual abuse or 
gender-based violence than women who are not Black, disabled, Roma, belonging to 
indigenous populations and sexual minorities. 38  So while women are making 
progress, the condition of women who also belong to other disadvantaged groups is 
not improving nearly as much as or as fast as, men and other women who are 
disadvantaged only because of their sex or gender. The question that arises then is 
how do we understand progress which is so disparate? Is progress progress if some 
are not part of it? The next section explains what it means for women’s equality and 
human rights to be understood intersectionally and why intersectionality begets 
progress which is both inclusive and transformative in nature.  
 
 
 2.2 Intersectionality and Transformation  
 
The term ‘intersectionality’ was coined by Crenshaw in 1989.39 Her contribution both 
drew on and then went on to develop over two centuries of Black feminist thought in 
the US.40 The running thread in the long intellectual history of intersectionality is the 
challenge to ‘the dominant conception’ of understanding disadvantage or 
                                                 
35 See for example the specific case of Domestic Violence Act 2005 enacted to give force to India’s 
international obligations under CEDAW in Sujata Gadkar-Wilkox, ‘Intersectionality and the Under-
Enforcement of Domestic Violence Laws in India’ (2012) 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Law and Social Change 455. 
36  IDSN briefing paper on Dalit 
<Womenhttp://idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/Key_Issues/Dalit_Women/DALIT_WOM
EN_-_IDSN_briefing_paper.pdf> (accessed 11 September 2017); Palak Nandil, ‘Dalit Women Cases: 
Crime Conviction Rate Poor’ (7 June 2011) The Times of India 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Dalit-women-cases-Crime-conviction-rate-
poor/articleshow/9131045.cms?referral=PM> (accessed 11 September 2017). 
37 See references for Dalit feminist discourse in (n 7). 
38 See Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241; Jennifer M Mays, ‘Feminist 
Disability Theory: Domestic Violence against Women with a Disability’ (2007) 21 Disability and 
Society 147; Roderick Brown, ‘Corrective Rape in South Africa: A Continuing Plight despite an 
International Human Rights Response’ (2012) 18 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 
45; Alexandra Oprea, ‘Re-envisioning Social Justice from the Ground Up: Including the Experiences 
of Romani Women’ (2014) 1 Essex Human Rights Review 29. 
39 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing’ (n 1). 
40 This section cannot do justice to the vast breadth of literature which inhabits the ‘burgeoning field of 
intersectional studies.’ (Sumi Cho, Kimberlé W Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, ‘Toward a Field of 
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785). It thus selectively 
refers to some of the key contributions that have defined the field, to distil a broad and common theme 
which has evolved over much debate, critique, and defence. For longer, more comprehensive accounts 
see Ange-Marie Hancock, An Intellectual History of Intersectionality (OUP 2016); Vivian M May, 
Pursuing Intersectionality: Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries (Routledge 2015); Anna Carastathis, 
Intersectionality: Origins, Contestations, Horizons (University of Nebraska Press 2016).  
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discrimination as along a single independent axis of race, sex, gender, class, caste, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status etc.41 Under the dominant 
conception, sex discrimination is understood as discrimination only on the basis of 
sex, such that it protects only white women who are solely disadvantaged by their sex 
or gender but not because of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation etc. 
Similarly, the prohibition on race discrimination covers those disadvantaged by race 
alone, like straight non-disabled middle-class Black men. Within this monist 
conception of discrimination, Black women fall through the cracks of both sex and 
race discrimination because they are disadvantaged by neither sex nor race alone, but 
by both of them at the same time: their disadvantage as Black women being both 
similar to but also different from that faced by white women and Black men. Taking 
the example of Black women, intersectionality theory underscores that structures of 
disadvantage do not exist independent of one another but are constituted by multiple 
and intersecting relationships of power associated with people’s race, sex, gender, 
class, caste, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status etc. 42 
Understood this way, intersectionality espouses anti-essentialism of categories like 
women and Blacks and of experiences of sex and race discrimination associated with 
them.43 It decries the notion that sex discrimination or discrimination against women 
has an essence which can be understood separately from other kinds of inequalities of 
race, caste, religion, disability, sexual orientation, age, marital status etc, and thus 
urges for discrimination to be understood intersectionally or as a whole.  
 Intersectionality theory aims to ‘go beyond mere comprehension of 
intersectional dynamics to transform[ing] them’.44 In other words, intersectionality 
ultimately aims to transcend intersectional discrimination and bring about social 
transformation.45 Such a transformation involves an overhaul of the structures and 
relationships of power in terms of unsettling institutional norms of hierarchical 
organisation which disadvantage certain people, especially those who belong to 
multiple disadvantaged groups.46 It thus coincides with the vision of transformative 
equality or transformative justice based on values of inclusive participation, 47 
accommodating difference, 48  and promoting social inclusion. 49  This involves a 
                                                 
41 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing’ (n 1) 150. 
42 See especially Crenshaw’s account of violence against Black women explained in these terms in 
Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins’ (n 38). Patricia Hill Collins calls this a ‘matrix of domination’ in 
Black Feminist Thought (2nd edn, Routledge 2009), and bell hooks terms it a ‘politic of domination’ in 
Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center (2nd edn, South End Press 2000) ch 2. 
43 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Women’s Press 
1990); Angela P Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law 
Review 581.  
44 Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (n 40) 786. 
45 See especially this connection developed in Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality 
(Polity Press 2016).  
46 UN Women, ‘A Transformative Stand-Alone Goal on Achieving Gender Equality, Women’s Rights 
and Women’s Empowerment: Imperatives and Key Components’ (2013) <http://www.ipu.org/splz-
e/unga13/women.pdf> (accessed 2 Sept 2017).  
47  Bob Hepple considers participation as key to transformation and his vision of transformative 
equality. Bob Hepple, ‘Transformative Equality: The Role of Democratic Participation’ paper 
presented at the Facing development: the North-South Challenge to Transnational Labour Law LLRN 
Conference in Barcelona June 2013 <https://www.upf.edu/documents/3298481/3410076/2013-
LLRNConf_SirBobHepple.pdf/d2fc160a-5b89-456a-9505-bffa977796de> (accessed 2 September 
2017). 
48 See the idea of transformation as accommodation of difference espoused by Sandra Fredman in her 
seminal account of multi-dimensional substantive equality in Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2011) ch 1. See also Cathi Albertyn, ‘Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 
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commitment to leaving no one behind and bringing about change which transforms 
the lives of one and all. In terms of the basement metaphor, transformation means 
eliminating intersectional discrimination such that everyone transitions to the floor 
above, no matter how far down the basement of inequality they reside; and with this, 
upturning the organisation of the basement as a hierarchical structure of disadvantage.  
 Thus, to understand women’s equality and human rights in intersectional 
terms means to understand that women are inhibited by multiple forms of structural 
disadvantage at once, and that the transformation of women’s condition means 
uplifting all women from and upturning all structures of disadvantage. 50  Celina 
Romany calls for a reconceptualisation of women’s human rights which would ‘refine 
and deepen an understanding of multiple oppressions and put on the table the 
discourse of difference.’ 51  This means that great care must be taken to present 
analyses of women’s human rights such that they reflect the diversity of women’s 
experiences of inequality. According to Elizabeth Spelman, this requires spelling out 
the difference in terms of specifying which women one is talking about when talking 
about women.52 The specificity in women’s identities and experiences foregrounds 
women’s human rights into real and lived experiences, and thus abandons ‘a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to the definition and enforcement of human rights.’53  
 So, intersectionality and its idea of progress as social transformation may be 
said to contribute to women’s movement and women’s human rights in two ways. 
First, theoretically it enlarges the conception of women’s disadvantage to include 
intersectional violations which are either conceptually excluded or obscured from our 
vision. For example, it expands the domain of what counts as ‘sex discrimination’ or 
‘violations of women’s rights’ to include experiences of women who suffer not only 
as women but also as Blacks, disabled, Dalit, lesbians etc. Second, strategically it 
opens up ways of organising not only around commonalities but also around 
differences.54 For example, intersectionality provides an opportunity to groups like 
Black women and Dalit women to build connections and solidarities within broader 
identity-groups like women, relate differently to other groups like Black and Dalit 
men on a reconfigured ground of intersectionality, and even deploy essentialism 
‘strategically’ once both commonalities and differences are taken into account rather 
than discounted.55 It thus furnishes a basis for strategies to be truly inclusive and 
effective, and hence transformative. Intersectionality is thus important not for any 
other purpose, but for the reason women’s movement and women’s human rights 
                                                                                                                                           
South African Journal on Human Rights 257; Cathi Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt, ‘Facing the 
Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of 
Equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248.  
49  Hugh Collins offers an account of social inclusion as the ultimate goal of equality law in 
‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16.  
50 In the words of Lisa Crooms: ‘In the international human-rights arena, women’s human rights must 
reflect the multiple identities of women across cultural, national, religious, ethnic, and racial barriers.’ 
Lisa A Crooms, ‘Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities or, “What Do Women's Human Rights 
Have to Do with the Race Convention?”’ (1996) 40 Howard Law Journal 619, 634. 
51 Celina Romany, ‘On Surrendering Privilege: Diversity in a Feminist Redefinition of Human Rights 
Law’ in Margaret Schuler (ed), From Basic Needs to Basic (DC: Women, Law and Development 
International 1995) 549 
52 Spelman (n 43) 186. 
53 Crooms (n 50) 634-35.  
54 Jennifer Nash puts it as the project of attending to both ‘intersectionality’s attention to difference 
while also strategically mobilizing the language of commonality.’ Jennifer C Nash, ‘Re-thinking 
Intersectionality’ (2008) 89 Feminist Review 1, 4. 
55 This discussion features in section 4.2 below. 
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exist — for their theoretical coherence of relating to all women and their 
disadvantage, for being able to identify and redress such disadvantage; and for 
strategic reasons for building solidarity or unity in diversity, from the ground up not 
on high. 
 Conversely, in neglecting the theoretical and pragmatic dimensions of 
intersectionality, one produces a lopsided account of inequality and strategies to 
remedy them. Intersectionality is thus not just any other theory or critique of women’s 
human rights. It is, I believe, the kernel of women’s progress and human rights. It is 
about who we count as women in the movement, how we understand 
women’s disadvantage, and how we want to see it addressed. 
 The question that arises in respect of CEDAW is, how far the document and 
its jurisprudence embrace intersectionality and its vision of transformation? The next 
section unearths CEDAW’s slowly but surely growing intersectional roots.  
 
 2.3 CEDAW’s Intersectional Transformation 
 
At the outset, it is useful to note that intersectionality is no central theme of CEDAW. 
The term or its explanation does not feature in the text of CEDAW. The definition of 
‘discrimination against women’ in article 1 is limited to ‘distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of sex’ and does not refer to other grounds like race, 
caste, religion, region, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status etc. Sporadic 
references to women’s identities as mothers,56 and wives,57 and to rural women and 
poverty 58  hint at, but stop short of a clear commitment towards, understanding 
discrimination and women’s human rights intersectionally. This brought academics 
and activists alike to pour scorn over CEDAW’s fundamental reliance on comparison 
with men and ignoring inequalities between women. 59  The absence of expressly 
defining discrimination and violation of women’s human rights in terms of women’s 
other identities of race, class, caste, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, 
marital status etc, was seen as limiting CEDAW to women who were disadvantaged 
only as women but privileged otherwise.60 
 Yet, over the years, CEDAW has undergone an intersectional transformation 
of sorts; being opened up to such reinterpretation by the CEDAW Committee. One of 
the first expressions of such a change was General Recommendation No. 18 which 
recognised ‘the situation of disabled women, who suffer from a double discrimination 
linked to their special living conditions.’ 61  This was followed up by General 
Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women which acknowledged that 
gender-based violence could afflict poor, unemployed and rural women, and young 
girls differently. 62  The focus on poverty and rural women continued in General 
Recommendation No. 24 on women’s right to health under Article 12 and General 
                                                 
56 CEDAW, art 5(b). 
57 CEDAW, arts 7, 11(2), 16(1). 
58 CEDAW, art 14(1). 
59 Dianne Otto, ‘Women’s Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2010) 345, 354-55; Darren Rosenblum, ‘Unisex CEDAW or 
What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights’ (2012) 20 Columbia Journal of Law and Gender 98, 193. 
60 See in particular this discussion in relation to gender-based violence Shreya Atrey, ‘Lifting as We 
Climb: Recognising Intersectional Gender Violence in Law’ (2015) 5 Onati Socio-Legal Series 1512. 
61 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 18 on Disabled Women, 10th Session (1991) 
pmbl. 
62 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence against Women, 11th Session 
(1992) [14] [15] [21].  
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Recommendation No. 26 on women migrant workers.63 A more precise statement 
appeared in General Recommendation No. 27 which proclaimed that: 
The discrimination experienced by older women is often multidimensional, with the age factor 
compounding other forms of discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, disability, poverty 
levels, sexual orientation and gender identity, migrant status, marital and family status, 
literacy and other grounds. Older women who are members of minority, ethnic or indigenous 
groups, internally displaced or stateless often experience a disproportionate degree of 
discrimination.64 
 But it was only in 2010, when intersectionality was embraced unambiguously 
in universal terms, through a seminal statement in General Recommendation No. 28 
declaring that: 
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general obligations of 
States parties contained in article 2. The discrimination of women based on sex and gender is 
inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or 
belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to a 
different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such 
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the women 
concerned and prohibit them.65 
 Succeeding General Recommendations have followed suit in making 
intersectionality central to women’s equality and enjoyment of human rights.66 The 
most visible impact of this has been on individual decisions under the Optional 
Protocol. Whilst early communications decided by the CEDAW Committee stuck to a 
sex or gender-only analysis, the jurisprudence in the last ten years has shown acute 
awareness of using intersectionality for understanding causally on what basis women 
suffer violations of their rights, especially when that basis is compounded by race, 
disability, poverty etc, in addition to gender. 67  Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira 
(deceased) v Brazil,68 Kell v Canada,69 RPB v Philippines,70 and MW v Denmark71 are 
prominent examples of this. Alyne concerned the case of a socio-economically 
disadvantaged woman of Afro-Brazilian descent who lost her life in the absence of 
appropriate medical treatment during pregnancy and emergency obstetric care. In a 
first, the Committee found the State Party to be accountable for intersectional 
discrimination, having violated the rights to life, health, and non-discrimination under 
CEDAW not only on the basis of the deceased’s gender but gender, race, and socio-
economic background combined: 
The Committee notes the author’s claim that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira suffered from 
multiple discrimination, being a woman of African descent and on the basis of her socio-
economic background…The State party also acknowledged that the convergence or 
association of the different elements described by the author may have contributed to the 
                                                 
63 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 24 on Women and Health, 20th Session (1999) 
[7] [25] [28]; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers, 
32nd Session (2008) [6] [7] [8] [14].  
64 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 27 on Older Women and Protection of their 
Human Rights, 42nd Session (2010) [13].  
65 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties 
under Article 2, 47th Session (2010) [18]. 
66 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 34 on Rights of Rural women, 56th Session 
(2016) [14] [15]; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-based Violence 
against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19, 68th Session (2017) [12] [23] [28] [37b] 
[41] [43] [48] [49] [50].  
67 See esp for an account of missed opportunities, Atrey (n 60) 1520-125.  
68 Communication No. 17/2008 (views adopted on 25 July 2011). 
69 Communication No. 19/2008 (views adopted on 28 February 2012). 
70 Communication No. 34/2011 (views adopted on 21 February 2014). 
71 Communication No. 46/2012 (views adopted on 22 February 2016). 
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failure to provide necessary and emergency care to her daughter, resulting in her death. In 
such circumstances, the Committee concludes that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira was 
discriminated against, not only on the basis of her sex, but also on the basis of her status as a 
woman of African descent and her socio-economic background.
72 
 In the same vein, both Kell and RPB show the Committee’s awareness of 
intersectionality in cases of gender-based violence. In Kell, the Committee found that 
the author had suffered an ‘act of intersectional discrimination’ since ‘she was an 
aboriginal woman victim of domestic violence…and that such violence had the effect 
of impairing the exercise of her property rights’.73 This finding led the Committee to 
recommend specific provisions of relief in relation to aboriginal women who suffered 
from distinct patterns of gender-based violence and discrimination in property 
rights.74 Similarly, in RPB, the Committee examined judicial reliance on stereotypes 
about rape scenarios not only in relation to gender myths but also in relation to the 
victim’s young age and disability as a deaf-mute girl. It thus specifically mandated the 
State Party to: ‘[e]nsure that all criminal proceedings involving rape and other sexual 
offences are conducted in an impartial and fair manner and free from prejudices or 
stereotypical notions regarding the victim’s gender, age and disability.’75 In the recent 
claim of MW v Denmark, the Committee made similar observations in the case of a 
foreign mother who had experienced severe difficulty and discrimination in 
approaching the Danish authorities for the release of her son impounded abroad. The 
Committee held that: ‘discrimination against women on the basis of sex and gender is 
inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as nationality, and that 
States parties must legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and 
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned, and prohibit them.’76 
 The upshot of this interpretive development of reading in intersectionality as 
part of CEDAW has been to enlarge the scope of protection from discrimination in 
the enjoyment of human rights to women who are intersectionally disadvantaged. 
This is possible only when the Committee is causally aware of the specific patterns of 
discrimination which afflict such women. Since these patterns are both similar to and 
also different from women who are only singularly disadvantaged and also other men, 
their specificity is required not only for the Committee’s diagnostic role of 
understanding and addressing intersectional discrimination as such; but also for 
activists, claimants, and their lawyers to formulate demands and claims in ways which 
are both true to the diversity of women’s lived experiences and also capable of 
representing and achieving women’s goals. 
 These achievements are no mean feat. They have come after a long fight for 
the recognition of intersectionality and the need for speaking to and uplifting women 
who were intersectionally disadvantaged in accessing their human rights.77 CEDAW 
                                                 
72 Alyne (n 68) [7.7]. 
73 Kell (n 69) [10.2]. 
74 ibid [10.3]. 
75 RPB (n 70) [9(b)(iii)]. 
76 MW v Denmark (n 71) [5.8]. 
77 See Johanna Bond, ‘Intersecting Identities and Human Rights: The Example of Romani Women’s 
Reproductive Rights’ (2004) 5 Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 897; Johanna Bond, 
International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s International 
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jurisprudence has slowly but surely opened up to intersectional discrimination 
through its General Recommendations, decisions under the Optional Protocol, and 
even the country reporting process as we see below in section 4. CEDAW has thus 
finally come to provide, as Frances Raday argues, ‘the basis for transformative 
equality…tak[ing] into account a wide range of intersectional needs.’78 In this way, 
the recognition of multiple and specific forms of women’s discrimination and 
violation of their human rights has been significant in the sense of relating to and 
representing women who suffer from intersectional discrimination, and also rectifying 
the structures which cause the same. The seeds for this intersectional transformation 
were in the text itself. In particular, this transformative vision of CEDAW is 
embraced in Article 5(a) which mandates State Parties: ‘to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for men and women.’ General Recommendation No. 25 further endorsed this 
transformative aim in specifying that:  
the position of women will not be improved as long as the underlying causes of discrimination 
against women, and of their inequality, are not effectively addressed. The lives of women and 
men must be considered in a contextual way, and measures adopted towards a real 
transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded 
in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.79  
 The recent developments embracing intersectionality capitalise on these 
transformative possibilities of going beyond a mere anti-disadvantage or anti-
stereotyping approach to reimagining a radical overhaul of a society such that ‘those 
features of existing cultures, religions or traditions and of legal, social and economic 
structures that obstruct the equality and human dignity of women are subjected to 
fundamental change.’80 
 The answer to Nussbaum’s ‘prior question whether the document itself, and 
related documents, are good’ is still evolving in relation to intersectionality and its 
transformative vision. Whilst intersectionality remained a glaring gap in the early 
years of CEDAW jurisprudence, it is clear that intersectionality has been able to 
expand its foothold gradually. However, Nussbaum’s analysis of women’s progress 
and women’s human rights as enabled by CEDAW, misses this development. It 
presents a view of successes and failures which speak to only a cross-section of 
women at a time, and leaves intact broader patterns of gender discrimination which 
are connected to, but not solely determined by, gender. The case of Dalit women is 
particularly poignant in this regard. The next two sections subject claims of successes 
and failures of CEDAW to an intersectional perspective in the context of Dalit women 
and the Dalit feminist movement. 
 
3. Intersectionality and the Enforcement of CEDAW  
 
Direct enforcement of international law is a complicated terrain where, for example, 
the impact of CEDAW though purportedly progressive may not be ultimately 
                                                 
78  Frances Raday, ‘Gender and Democratic Citizenship: The Impact of CEDAW’ (2012) 10 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 512, 529. 
79 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures, 30th Session 
(2004) [6] [7] [10]. 
80 Rikki Holtmaat, ‘The CEDAW: A Holistic Approach to Women’s Equality and Freedom’ in Anne 
Hellum and Henriette Sinding Aasen (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, 
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transformative. The assessment of what is transformative and hence in line with the 
goals and purposes of CEDAW may have to be intersectional in order to ensure that 
CEDAW is used in ways which do not marginalise intersectional groups of women. 
Dalit women’s tryst with CEDAW though shows that this may readily be the case. 
This part takes the example of violence against Dalit women to make the point about 
the continued marginalisation of Dalit women’s intersectional position in the way 
CEDAW is enforced. Section 3.1 exemplifies this point by critiquing the silencing of 
the Dalit feminist voice in Vishaka—Nussbaum’s example of the most assured 
success of the direct enforcement of CEDAW. Section 3.2 takes a more holistic view 
of the direct enforcement of CEDAW by the Indian Supreme Court to examine the 
myriad other ways in which CEDAW has been invoked and to conclude that its use 
has been highly variable for intersectional groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1 A Dalit Feminist Critique of Vishaka 
 
Bhanwari Devi is a Dalit woman. She works as a government volunteer for the State 
of Rajasthan in India where her job is to campaign against the outlawed but still 
prevalent social evils like female foeticide, infanticide, and dowry. In 1992, Bhanwari 
Devi passionately took up the cause against child marriage. She worked tirelessly to 
educate her fellow villagers and prevent child marriages in her State which remains a 
prolific site for them even today. Bhanwari came to know of the wedding of a nine-
month old daughter of a Gurjar (upper-caste) family and tried preventing it with the 
help of local authorities. The Gurjars were influential and were evidently offended. 
On 22 September 1992, a group of five Gurjar men approached Bhanwari and her 
husband who were working in their fields and started beating up her husband with 
sticks. When Bhanwari tried to intervene two men pinned her down and the other 
three took turns raping her. Bhanwari decided to report her rape. Her complaint was 
disbelieved by the police, the investigation was botched up and her case went up 
before a judge who, in 1995, three years after the incident, let all the accused go scot-
free. His reason for acquittal being that, upper-caste men could not possibly have 
raped a Dalit woman. The judgment sent shock waves throughout the country leading 
to widespread collective protests and marches. It was then, that the Rajasthan-based 
NGO, Vishaka, amongst others, decided to file a writ petition at the Supreme Court of 
India to make workplaces safer for women. On 13 August 1997, the Court delivered 
its decision in the case of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan.81 The decision was ground-
breaking because, in the absence of domestic legislation on the subject, the Court 
relied on international obligations assumed by India, especially under CEDAW and 
the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary concluded in 
1995, to promulgate extensive guidelines on the protection of women from sexual 
harassment in the workplace. The Court held that: 
The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India 
[under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21] are of sufficient amplitude to compass all the facets of 
gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. Independence of 
Judiciary forms a part of our constitutional scheme. The international conventions and norms 
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are to be read into them in the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the fields when 
there is no inconsistency between them.82  
 Bhanwari Devi became the catalyst for one of the most significant 
developments in women’s human rights in the country, that too brought about by the 
judiciary not the legislature, all with the help of international law adopted in 
CEDAW. Though neither the judgment nor the commentary following it make much 
of the violation of her human rights or human rights of Dalit women which continue 
to be violated in specific and routine ways. The Supreme Court opened and dispensed 
with the immediate context which gave rise to the writ petition by proclaiming that: 
The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incident of alleged brutal gang 
rape of social worker in a village of Rajasthan. That incident is the subject matter of a separate 
criminal action and no further mention of it, by us, is necessary.  The incident reveals the 
hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the depravity to which sexual 
harassment can degenerate …83 
 Nussbaum follows suit in describing the writ petition as occasioned by ‘an 
alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village in Rajasthan.’84 Nussbaum 
then notes in parenthesis that ‘This case was the subject of a separate criminal action, 
and it played no further role in the petition.’85  Deemed covered by the ‘separate 
criminal action’, Bhanwari Devi was systematically erased from the story of Vishaka 
which continues to be told with aplomb by courts and commentators alike as the 
leading example of the invocation of CEDAW for enforcing women’s human rights 
domestically.86 Except, Bhanwari is 56 today, and twenty-five years after she was 
gang-raped, still waiting for justice to be served in the ‘separate criminal action’ 
pending before the Rajasthan High Court.87 The interminably delayed justice in her 
case is reason enough to pause and contemplate about progress made without justice 
for the actual victim. But Vishaka’s record must be set straight on several other 
counts. First, the case which occasioned the writ petition was one of sexual assault not 
sexual harassment. Cynthia Stephen reminds us of the difference this difference 
makes in her seething words: 
There is plenty of money and media coverage for campaigns for redress to urban educated 
girls who face violence at the workplace, but nothing, almost, for justice to victims of caste-
based atrocities faced by Dalit women, when they are raped when working in the fields, but 
both kinds of violence are lumped together under the term Violence against Women. I feel that 
there is little willingness among feminists to acknowledge the reality that violence faced by 
the middleclass woman is nothing compared with the level and scale of structural violence that 
rural Dalits women – the majority – face.88 
 The mischaracterisation or recharacterisation of an incident of gang rape as 
sexual harassment at work for the purposes of the writ petition, devalues Dalit 
women’s experience of sexual violence as merely an occasion for legal reform for 
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other women to suit purposes which relate to them first, and to Dalit women after.89 
Dalit women’s sexual assault becomes marginal, relevant only to the extent that it 
coincides with the demands and desires of upper-caste women. As a result, Vishaka 
engaged little with the reality of sexual violence against Dalit women which takes 
specific forms. Being both outcastes and women, Dalit women not only suffer from 
casteism and untouchability in the form of public exclusion and segregation just as 
Dalit men, but also suffer from patriarchy just as upper-caste women.90 But their 
experience of casteism and patriarchy differs from both Dalit men and upper-caste 
women in that Dalit women suffer some unique forms of exploitation.91 Thus, for 
example, in addition to suffering from caste-based violence and rape, Dalit women 
are subjected to violence which is unique to them: stripping, naked parading, pulling 
out of hair and nails, sexual slavery, and bondage.92 Even typically gender-based 
crimes like rape, molestation, immoral trafficking, and prostitution take a different 
form when committed against Dalit women.93 The difference lies in the very public 
nature in which Dalit women are targeted, their violations never hidden or obscured, 
but meant to provide a spectacle and be taken a lesson from.94 All sides are supposed 
to be privy to their violations—upper-caste women are meant to view it with a sense 
of distance, as violence meted out to those unlike them and thus reminding them of 
their higher status as upper-caste; Dalit men are meant to view it with shame and 
regret, being punished vicariously for their transgressions; upper-caste men as 
perpetrators, who deem it their right, and in fact their duty, to impart these lessons 
through the bodies of Dalit women; and the police and the justice delivery system 
view it with a sense of disbelief and incredulity, deeming upper-caste men as 
incapable of assaulting Dalit women at all, and thus imparting impunity as justice.95 
 Bhanwari Devi’s case was thus paradigmatic of the kind of violence meted out 
to Dalit women which is public in nature—taking the form of sexual violence against 
Dalit women whose bodies are considered open to exploitation by upper-caste men 
but still carrying the burden of Dalit pride; meant for protecting the honour of the 
upper-caste, especially upper-caste women (girls) who must marry per caste norms 
                                                 
89 Report, National Tribunal Violence against Dalit Women in India (30th September and 1st October, 
2013) 6-7. 
90 Sharmila Rege, ‘“Real Feminism” and Dalit Women: Scripts of Denial and Accusation’ (2000) 35 
Economic and Political Weekly 492; Sharmila Rege, ‘Dalit Women Talk Differently: A Critique of 
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Weekly 39. 
91 Gopal Guru, ‘Dalit Women Talk Differently’ (1995) 30 Economic and Political Weekly 2548.  
92 National Tribunal Report (n 989) 2.  
93 Laxmi Murthy and Rajashri Dasgupta, Our Pictures, Our Words: A Visual Journey through the 
Women’s Movement (Zubaan 2011) 35-36 (‘The use of rape as a tool to force submission is rife in 
areas where struggles for self-determination are ongoing. It is also used to subdue those who have 
dared to challenge their suppression, be it Dalits, Adivasis, or the poor’). 
94 This difference is too often undermined. As Nussbaum writes elsewhere, ‘it is particularly common 
for women whose caste status [as upper-caste women] makes it shameful for them to seek employment 
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(Harvard University Press 2011) 9. Public forms of sexual abuse and humiliation are a high price to 
pay for circulating ‘freely’. Employment options which Dalit women access ‘freely’ like manual 
scavenging and devdasi system (a system of dedicating Dalit women to temples as a religiously 
legitimised form of sexual exploitation and abuse by upper-caste men), are also far from what 
Nussbaum would admit as emancipatory within the capabilities approach.  
95 See Anuapma Rao, The Caste Question (University of California Press 2009) ch 6, where Rao 
provides a thoroughgoing account of the public nature of violence suffered by Dalit women through the 
example of the legal rendering of the Sirasgaon incident. 
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(such as child marriage); serving as reprisal for the transgressions of Dalits in 
challenging these caste norms (like Bhanwari); witnessed by Dalit men who are 
meant to learn a lesson from the violation of their women’s bodies (Bhanwari’s 
husband); and characterised by full impunity for the upper-caste men responsible for 
it (the Gurjar men). 
 Second, as a result, the entire legal discourse on Vishaka missed the fact that 
Bhanwari Devi suffered sexual violence which was inherently intersectional in nature. 
The reason for the violence to have taken the form of gang rape was caste.96 Bhanwari 
was targeted not simply because she is a woman but particularly because she is a Dalit 
woman.97 This fact played no role in crafting the response to women’s issues of 
gender justice to speak to women who were targeted because of their caste.98 Neither 
the text of the judgment nor, what Nussbaum calls, ‘admirably clear and 
comprehensive set of guidelines’ 99  mention caste as what dictates violations of 
women’s human rights in addition to gender. Here, the Court was directly borrowing 
from Article 11 of CEDAW on the right to employment, which had been interpreted 
in General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women as including the right 
against sexual assault and sexual harassment. Vishaka adopted the definition of sexual 
harassment proposed in paragraph 18 of General Recommendation No. 19 which was 
defined exclusively in terms of women’s sex or gender. In fact nowhere did General 
Recommendation No. 19 mention that sexual violence against women could be 
motivated not only by women’s sex or gender but also by their race, class, caste, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status etc. In 1997, the CEDAW 
Committee was still thirteen years from recognising intersectionality, and twenty 
years from proclaiming that ‘because women experience varying and intersecting 
forms of discrimination, which have an aggravating negative impact, the Committee 
acknowledges that gender-based violence may affect some women to different 
degrees, or in different ways.’ 100  The continued sidelining of intersectionality in 
discussing Vishaka today though is as perplexing as flawed, given these developments 
and those recounted in section 3.3 above.   
 Third, the erasure of the intersectional perspective also left the casteist 
reasoning of the lower court’s judgment unchallenged—which was the reason why 
Bhanwari’s case was brought to light at all. To remind, the decision which is pending 
appeal was one which had found that: 
Indian culture has not fallen to such low depths that someone who is brought up in it, an 
innocent, rustic man, will turn into a man of evil conduct who disregards caste and age 
differences — and becomes animal enough to [assault] a woman.101 
 The judge below had not only relied on caste difference as conclusive of the 
fact that no rape could have ever occurred but through this propagated the culture of 
                                                 
96 Guru (n 91) 2548 (‘The question of rape cannot be grasped merely in terms of class, criminality, or 
as a psychological aberration or an illustration of the male violence. The caste factor also has to be 
taken into account which makes sexual violence against dalit or tribal women much more severe in 
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97 Mangala Subramaniam and Preethi Krishnan Ramaswamy, ‘Gender, Caste, and Class: Structural 
Violence in India’ in Shirley A Jackson, Routledge International Handbook of Race, Class, and 
Gender (Routledge 2015) 240 (‘In the Indian context, caste and gender are systems of oppression 
experienced simultaneously by women’). 
98 Similarly, in case of Black women, Angela Harris explains the qualitatively distinct nature of rape as 
‘a far more complex experience, and an experience as deeply rooted in color as in gender.’ Angela P 
Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581, 598. 
99 Nussbaum (n 4) 615. 
100 General Recommendation No. 35 (n 66) [12]. 
101 Kannabiran (n 86) 398. 
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impunity for upper-caste men responsible for the crime. Similar casteist reasoning 
was left unchallenged in the case of custodial rape of Mathura, a sixteen-year old 
tribal girl, which Nussbaum cites as another case which did not deliver justice for the 
victim, but did ‘however, energize the women’s movement and the academic 
community to demand legal change’. 102  The criminal law amendments which 
followed in 1983 were radical for their time, in that they declared it an offence to 
reveal the identity of rape victims, shifted the burden of proof to be on the accused 
when the victim claims that she did not consent; and, deleted the provision referring 
to the character of the prosecutrix in rape cases. But they did not touch upon caste, the 
reason for which Mathura was gang-raped in police custody and her complaint was 
mishandled and eventually disbelieved. 103  The gains for the women’s movement 
centered around two of the biggest cases in India, of Mathura and Bhanwari Devi, 
thus seem partial and accruing only to upper-caste middle-class women. As Rege 
concludes: ‘From Mathura to Bhanwari, the Indian  women’s movement had 
addressed the issues and cases of women of dalit, tribal and minority 
communities, but it is one thing to address their issues and another to revision politics 
to centre around the issues of the most marginalised of women.’104 In using CEDAW 
to homogenise claims of Dalit women as claims of gender discrimination alone rather 
than recentering gender discrimination around caste and other structures of 
disadvantage, the Indian Supreme Court seems to have narrowed the transformative 
scope of the treaty which speaks to the condition of all women in fact.  
 Lastly, and for all these reasons it matters for the record to be set straight, 
because Vishaka has been the hallmark of resounding success of direct application of 
CEDAW, not only for Nussbaum but for countless others.105 The institutional failure 
to address caste as a gender issue is appropriated as evidence of institutional success 
of CEDAW.106 But in fact the obliteration of caste stories of Mathura, Bhanwari Devi, 
and Dalit women from the story of the women’s movement and CEDAW perpetuates 
the interminable cycle of disadvantage experienced by women of caste. In dubbing 
their stories as success stories, we may be contributing to their interminable cycle of 
disadvantage. Nussbaum argues that after sixteen years of Vishaka, the legislation 
which followed in the form of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013, ‘is extremely closely modeled on 
Vishaka, hence, in part, on the Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee, so we 
can say that CEDAW had a major effect, though several steps removed… At least we 
may conclude that CEDAW, and especially the CEDAW Committee, made a 
difference to the law—when a domestic legislature had already ratified the pertinent 
documents.’107 There is no doubt about this. India got a set of Guidelines and a new 
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law eventually on sexual harassment because of CEDAW. But given the serious 
oversights of Vishaka in ignoring all elements of caste from what was, originally an 
intersectional problem of caste-based sexual assault, we can temper the conclusion 
about the ‘major effect’ of CEDAW in this case. In particular, two modifications to 
Nussbaum’s conclusion are in order. First, that the progress made was not 
intersectional in nature, in that even though Vishaka was no marginal success, it 
ended up marginalising exactly the one (Bhanwari Devi) and a million other Dalit 
women to whom the case belonged in reality. Second, the progress was thus also not 
transformative in nature in that it failed to understand and then overturn the complex 
patterns of intersectional gender violence which were public in nature and suffered 
specifically by those disadvantaged by gender, caste, and class at the same time.108 
 In sum, Vishaka was so much more than what appears in the text of the 
judgment, the Guidelines and the commentary which followed in its praise. It was a 
case which rode at the back of a heinous atrocity against a Dalit woman but ended up 
dumping it by the wayside as it sanitised an incident of caste-based sexual assault into 
gender-based sexual harassment. Vishaka remains far from the ideals of complete 
justice and transformative progress in its failure to appreciate the intersectionality of 
its origins.  
 
 3.2 Beyond Vishaka 
 
Vishaka though is not alone in invoking CEDAW for less than transformative results 
for women’s equality and human rights. CEDAW has been cited nearly twenty five 
times by the Supreme Court of India.109 Beyond Vishaka, other landmark judgments 
show deep fissures in the invocation of CEDAW for supporting different versions of 
equality for different women’s groups. The decision in State of Maharashtra v Indian 
Hotel and Restaurants Association110 demonstrates this gap keenly. The case involved 
a constitutional challenge to the ban on ‘bar dancing’ in restaurants rated three stars 
and below in Maharashtra. The government believed that these establishments served 
as spots for illegal trafficking and prostitution in the garb of bar dancing. It thus 
justified the ban as being in consonance with CEDAW by preventing ‘the direct and 
indirect effect on the exploitation of women, and the resultant and causative violence 
                                                 
108 It is though useful to note that some are more hopeful in that, for example, Kannabiran notes that: 
‘The guidelines on the issue of sexual harassment in the Visakha case were framed from the standpoint 
of the situation of a working-class dalit woman’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the dominant castes, the police, 
and the state/government…The significance of this decision lies in the judicial recognition of the 
notion of ‘hostile environments’ as obstructing women’s equal entry into employment — a notion that 
could be extended by courts to understand better the subjugation of women in patriarchal societies 
divided along multiple, intersecting lines of caste, class, religion, and gender, among other axes, not 
severally but in conjunction with each other.’ Kannabiran (n 106) 367-368. As I have argued, the text 
of the judgment, the Guidelines and the eventual legislation do not reflect this position. There is little 
there in the legal discourse resulting from Vishaka which shows the epistemic understanding of Dalit 
women’s specific vulnerability and even though Guidelines were wide and open-ended the lack of 
specific mention and intersectional couching, it is hard to agree with Kannabiran off hand. Rather, 
there is evidence to the fact that intersectionality and the position of women disadvantaged in an 
intersectional way seems to have been systematically sidelined in constitutional interpretation in India. 
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109 The High Courts and Lower Courts invocation of CEDAW is far more prodigious. The online portal 
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against women’.111 It is significant to note that this position was shared with Dalit 
feminists who, as Nivedita Menon describes, ‘argued that such forms of 
“entertainment” [bar dancing] are not only patriarchal, but also casteist, since many 
Dalit women come from castes that are traditionally forced into such professions. 
Thus, the discomfort of Dalit feminists with sex work and professions seen to be 
related to prostitution (such as dancing for male audiences in bars), cannot be seen 
only in terms of conventional morality.’112 In lifting the ban, the Court adopted a 
position which was diametrically opposite to this one. It found the ban to be 
unconstitutional because it violated the right to livelihood of over 75,000 bar dancers 
who were left jobless and without means to support themselves and their families.113 
In preferring to see bar dancing as a neutral occupation/work or form of livelihood 
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court overlooked the casteist implications of bar 
dancing, where those who actually perform it are often lower-caste lower-class 
women who are forced into it as professions exclusively earmarked for them and 
organised to in turn exploit them.114 The Bar Dancers case is thus an inverse of 
Vishaka where the citation of CEDAW seems to support a position held by Dalit 
feminists for reading in the caste implications of gendered violations, though this 
reading was ultimately passed over for a position which was avowedly caste-neutral 
just as in Vishaka.  
 The pattern of the invocation of CEDAW is thus highly variegated—a sliding 
scale with direct enforcement of CEDAW on the one hand, the interpretation of 
CEDAW provisions for bolstering women’s equality under the Constitution and 
various beneficial legislations in the middle, and the mere citation of CEDAW in 
judgments on the other. None of the strategies though, seem to automatically ensure 
progress which is transformative or that which takes into account the condition of 
intersectional groups of women like Dait women, adivasi (tribal) women or Muslim 
women. Take for example the most recent invocation of CEDAW in the decision of 
Shayara Bano v Union of India115 which outlawed the practice of triple talaq (the 
pronouncement of divorce by a Muslim husband by saying ‘talaq’ [urdu for divorce] 
three times over) under Muslim personal law. Despite a progressive result, the 
reasoning or the route to declaring the practice of triple talaq unconstitutional was 
hardly based on a progressive reading of rights or equality. In fact the triple talaq is 
emblematic of the way CEDAW is invoked rhetorically rather than substantively. The 
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Court in Shayara Bano at para 74 reminds that India must adhere to applicable 
international law which includes the commitment to gender equality and goes to cite 
the relevant provisions from CEDAW.116  Yet, concerns of gender equality either 
within article 15(1) of the Constitution which prohibits sex and religion based 
discrimination or within CEDAW did not become the basis on which triple talaq was 
ultimately outlawed. Instead Justice Nariman (along with Justice Lalit) found that the 
practice was unconstitutional on the basis that it was arbitrary and hence violative of 
article 14 on the right to equality of the Constitution.117 For a decision touted to be 
one of the most significant victories for the rights of Muslim women in India, the 
Shayara Bano dicta appears to equate women’s equality to simply a matter of non-
arbitrariness. Needless to say, it creates a rather narrow platform for challenging deep 
seated structural discrimination faced by Muslim women based on their religion, 
gender, and class on an everyday basis.  
 This though has been a long held strategy where women’s rights are given 
relief based on CEDAW but in a rather perfunctory and partial way or at least not on 
an equal basis with men as envisaged in CEDAW. One of the first decisions which 
cited CEDAW confirms this early trend. Gita Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India118 
concerned the constitutional validity of a provision under Hindu law which declared 
the natural guardian of a Hindu minor to be ‘the father, and after him, the mother’. 
The provision was challenged as against the principle of gender equality enshrined in 
article 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. Writing for the Court, Banerjee J set out the 
correct interpretation of the term ‘after’ as not necessarily after the death of the father, 
but ‘in the absence of’, be it temporary or otherwise total apathy of the father towards 
the child or even inability of the father by reason of ailment or otherwise.119 This he 
declared was the correct interpretation of the term constant with ideals of gender 
equality and justice enshrined in the Constitution and CEDAW. 120  The decision 
appears ironic—being based on equality and denying it all the same in that mothers 
are not treated on par with fathers as guardians of their children but merely as 
surrogates or fillers in the absence of fathers. The denial of dignity as a woman and 
rights as a mother, though not total, is certainly substantial.121 
The decision in Z v State of Bihar122 is another example of the Supreme Court 
deciding the matter on other grounds but bolstering or justifying that decision in light 
of India’s commitment to gender equality under CEDAW. In Z v State of Bihar, the 
Court ordered the state to provide compensation for the delay in terminating the 
pregnancy of a ‘mentally retarded’ (the phrase used in the judgment) woman who was 
raped and had consented to abort the foetus. The decision was taken under the 
Victims Compensation Scheme framed under section 357-A of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The Court simply parted by reminding itself of the reproductive rights of 
women guaranteed under the CEDAW to which India was a party.123 CEDAW seems 
to have played no interpretative role in the Court’s reasoning. In fact, mere citation of 
CEDAW as promoting women’s equality and gender justice seems to be the most 
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common way in which CEDAW is invoked at all,124 in addition to using CEDAW and 
its invocation in Vishaka for enforcing other international obligations.125 
Yet, there is a set of cases which has indeed used CEDAW in substantive and 
transformative ways – using it directly for overriding legislative provisions or policies 
which were against women’s equality and human rights. For example, in a single 
stroke, the Supreme Court made marriage registration compulsory citing CEDAW, 
despite the declaration under CEDAW which cited the impracticalness of enforcing 
compulsory marriage registration ‘in a vast country like India with its variety of 
customs, religions and level of literacy.’126 In another seminal example, CEDAW’s 
article 11 was used to extend maternity leave under the Maternity Benefit Act 1961 to 
part time workers and wage labourers. 127  While maternity leave was granted to 
regularised female workers at the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, those who were on 
the muster roll were excluded. The Court cited a slew of enabling constitutional 
provisions and provisions under the Maternity Benefit Act 1961 but ultimately quoted 
in full article 11 of CEDAW on the elimination of discrimination against women in 
the field of employment and establishing their right to work. It went on to hold and 
conclude that: ‘These principles which are contained in Article 11…have to be read 
into the contract of service between Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the women 
employees (muster roll); and so read these employees immediately become entitled to 
all the benefits conceived under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961… the benefits under 
the Act shall be provided to the women (muster roll) employees of the Corporation 
who have been working with them on daily wages.’128 In Charu Khurana v Union of 
India the Supreme Court broadly relied on gender equality enshrined in CEDAW to 
declare it unlawful for private make-up artists associations working in the cinema 
industry to be denying membership to female make up artists on the basis of their 
sex.129 The Supreme Court has even invoked CEDAW Committee’s decision in AS v 
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Hungary to support the reproductive rights of women and in particular for framing 
specific guidelines for informed consent in cases of sterilisation which did not 
previously exist.130 CEDAW has also been relied on in contexts like rehabilitation of 
children of prostitutes and child prostitutes131 for framing powerful orders directing 
the government to issue appropriate laws and guidelines or to implement them as a 
matter of international obligations assumed in CEDAW. Needless to say, CEDAW 
has been invoked to uphold punishments for sexual harassment – a crime created 
solely by relying on CEDAW in Vishaka.132 
The thread running through this set of cases which invoked CEDAW for 
clearly transformative results seems to be that CEDAW has been substantially 
relevant in filling legal gaps in situations which have been previously unregulated or 
sparsely regulated. In fact, the Supreme Court has not overstepped its limits in cases 
where clear laws exist and an improvement could only be brought about by the 
Parliament. In such cases, the Supreme Court has used CEDAW to urge the 
Parliament to strengthen laws, say in the case of increasing punishment for child 
sexual abuse under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code133 or for evaluating the 
monetary value of women’s housework for the purposes of compensation for a 
women’s relative under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, when the deceased women had 
no source of income.134 
 Thus, the Indian Supreme Court’s record of enforcing CEDAW presents 
variable results—giving some indication that CEDAW can be used in a robust manner 
to improve women’s condition but often showing a rather insubstantial or weak use of 
CEDAW. Two observations are in order. First, that studying the enforcement of 
CEDAW in domestic jurisdictions needs to be a more thoroughgoing exercise which 
picks on not just seemingly exemplary cases like Vishaka but a whole spectrum of 
cases which show the many ways in which international instruments are invoked in 
specific contexts like India—for mere citation, interpretation or direct application. 
Second, that the impact of these decisions and the ways in which CEDAW is enforced 
must be traced not only along gender lines but also, depending on context, in relation 
to intersectional groups affected. It is because what counts as progress for one set of 
women may not qualify as such for another. As seen through the example of Dalit 
women, this becomes especially problematic when those on the losing end are those 
who are intersectionally disadvantaged.  
 
4. Intersectionality, CEDAW and the Women’s Movement  
 
CEDAW works with many limitations at hand. It is an international treaty and is not 
per se directly enforceable. The bulk of the CEDAW Committee’s work in the form 
of the reporting process under Part V of the Convention ‘has no real teeth’.135 Even in 
the case of the Optional Protocol which establishes an individual complainants 
procedure, many countries have not ratified the Protocol, and where they have, the 
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Committee has been too deferential to national courts.136 General Recommendations 
though, as Nussbaum agrees, have gradually improved and have made significant 
contributions such as in the case of gender-based violence.137 The impact of CEDAW 
may then be more layered than imagined. This section explores how CEDAW has 
overcome its limitations in some ways and translated them into possibilities of greater 
intervention in targeted spaces. Section 4.1 shows that inspite of losing out on formal 
legal battles on an international and domestic plane, Dalit women have been able to 
raise consciousness by participating in the women’s movement transnationally. The 
success of the transnational women’s movement and CEDAW is thus defined not 
only in terms of building solidarity over commonalities but also crucially over 
accommodation of differences. Section 4.2 looks at some of the specific cases like 
abortion, contraception and sexual orientation which Nussbaum mentions as 
CEDAW’s glaring failures, and finds that CEDAW’s influence, once again, is more 
fine-grained than imagined.  
 
 
 
 4.1 Dalit Women’s Movement and CEDAW  
 
The fervent campaigning after the gang rapes of Mathura and Bhanwari Devi remains 
the hallmark of contemporary women’s movement in India. But in framing Dalit 
women’s sexual violence as a matter of gender alone, the mainstream feminist 
movement flattened out the complexity of their violations. Thus, Rege remarks on the 
handling of Mathura’s case:  
While the [National Federation of Indian Women] looked at rape in ‘class’ terms, the socialist 
women talked in terms of the ‘glass vessel cracking’ and therefore in terms of loss of honour, 
and the [All India Women's Conference] provided psychological explanations of the 
autonomous women’s groups highlighting the use of patriarchal power. Looking back at the 
anti-rape agitation, it is apparent that the sexual assaults on dalit women…did not become a 
nodal point for such an agitation, in fact they come to be excluded. The campaign therefore 
became more of a single issue one.138 
 Similarly, writing of Bhanwari Devi and the agitation around Vishaka, John 
reveals the contradictions in the position of the Indian state for supporting the 
women’s cause but ultimately failing in ‘implementing policies or laws in favour of a 
woman of a different class and caste, especially when it involves opposing those with 
whom the state identifies.’ 139  She thus concludes that the Indian 
state ‘overwhelmingly failed all but its privileged citizens’, which in the case of the 
women’s movement were the upper caste middle class women. The direct 
enforcement of CEDAW in Vishaka and legal intervention generally had left much to 
be desired from the women’s movement and women’s human rights by Dalit women.  
 Little has changed in terms of the orientation of the mainstream feminist 
movement in India and the government’s attitude towards it.140 Take for example the 
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national and global outrage against the gang-rape and murder of Jyoti Pandey in 
December 2012 in Delhi. The outrage found a commensurate response in the form of 
a Committee report prepared in record time, on the subject of: ‘possible amendments 
to the Criminal Law to provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for 
criminals committing sexual assault of extreme nature against women.’ 141  The 
Committee report is rife with concern for the position of women who face sexual 
violence not only as women but as women of caste, religion, culture, and region.142 
The Report encourages the State to recognise in unequivocal terms that: ‘No woman 
shall be unfairly discriminated on grounds of gender including…discrimination by 
virtue of a woman belonging to another sub-sect of caste, religion, region or race.’143 
Yet, the changes in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 inspired by the Report, 
do not reflect this position or see sexual violence as mediated by any other identity. In 
fact, despite the intervention in the progressive Justice Verma Committee Report, 
sexual violence against Dalit women continues unabated and unlamented, arousing 
little of the outrage shown towards sexual violence against upper-caste middle-class 
women. In 2014, Women against Sexual Violence and State Repression produced a 
report to ‘expose and understand the ongoing onslaught of sexual violence against 
dalit girls and women in the state of Haryana.’144 The Report juxtaposes its findings 
against the movement for responding to sexual violence since the 2012 incident. It is 
worth quoting its observations in full:  
In October 2012, dalit activists from media watch groups created a map of Haryana with the 
title ‘30 Days in a Rape State’ with locations and basic information on the rape of 19 Dalit 
girls that had been perpetrated in several districts during that month. This was followed by a 
list of 101 cases from across the country, gleaned from English newspapers and circulated on 
30 August 2013. An updated version of this list was circulated two months later, with the 
number of cases at 180—an increase by 80 percent in just two months. The day that this 
updated list was published—16 December 2013—marked the first anniversary of the fatal 
gang rape in Delhi that shocked the nation and created ripples across the world. In sharp 
contrast to the anger and outrage over the Delhi tragedy, public and media reactions to the 
equally horrifying ordeals of Dalit girls and women have been muted. Their stories receive 
only a cursory mention in the media and are seldom followed up with any seriousness. The 
wider public has not shown any serious concern. Even women’s movements across the 
country have not been able to respond to this explosion of sexual violence in Haryana in any 
sustained manner.145 
 The result has been a widespread disillusion with and alienation from the 
mainstream women’s movement. As Cynthia Stephen remarks in her scathing 
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critique, the Indian women’s movement has developed with ‘little understanding of 
the economic, religious, political and ideological isolation of Dalit women’.146 There 
remains a gap in relating to and understanding the nature of discrimination and 
violation of Dalit women’s human rights, especially when it comes to the sexual 
violence.  
 Dalit women’s movement and Dalit feminism emerged and has existed in this 
space of continued marginalisation. The National Federation of Dalit Women was 
formed in Delhi in 1995 by Ruth Manorama and continues to be a central space for 
Dalit women’s organisation, in addition to, more recently established All India Dalit 
Mahila Adhikar Manch launched in 2014 and various other regional organisations.147 
The highlight of Dalit women’s organisation though has been the possibility to 
canvass its issues not only in the domestic terrain, but through CEDAW, 
internationally. 148  Just as India ratified CEDAW in 1993, Dalit feminists started 
advocating for their causes through ‘transnational activism’. 149  The 
internationalisation of the Dalit women’s agenda was pursued vigorously at the UN 
World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) and Durban (2001), First World Dalit 
Convention in Kuala Lumpur (1998), establishment of the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network in Copenhagen (2000), the Hague Declaration on the Human 
Rights and Dignity of Dalit Women (2006).150 As Mahanta asks: ‘The question that is 
crucial in this context, however, is why the need was felt by the Dalit women’s 
movement in India to align itself with international forums for the furtherance of its 
domestic struggle.’151 Part of the answer lies in the already visible side-lining of Dalit 
women’s voices in the legal redressal of women’s claims. The other part relates to the 
strategy of pressing the Indian government for bringing change through an 
international channel rather than a domestic one. As Keck and Sikkink assert, this 
boomerang effect could be used to ‘persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over much 
more powerful organizations and governments’.152 In fact, the boomerang effect has 
proven to be effective for Dalit women in driving home their intersectional position as 
sharing commonalities with women generally, in India and abroad, but also having 
crucial differences between them based on their caste and class. The CEDAW 
Committee has shown acute appreciation of this dynamic of sameness and difference, 
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especially in the country reporting process where Dalit women’s intersectional 
position has been highlighted in the shadow reports drafted by NGOs and then later 
drawn upon by the Committee in its concluding observations. For example, in the 
58th review session alone when India’s latest report was considered in 2014, no less 
than thirteen shadow reports draw attention towards specific forms of intersectional 
discrimination suffered by Dalit women. 153  For example, one of the reports 
highlighted in great detail the public nature of violence against Dalit women: 
Dalit women are vulnerable to specific forms of violence. These forms include stripping and 
parading naked, violence associated with allegations of practicing witchcraft, sexual 
exploitation, trafficking and prostitution, including ritualized prostitution under 
Devadasi/Jogini practices, and domestic violence within inter-caste marriages. Statistics show 
that over 2,500 women have been killed on the suspicion of practicing witchcraft in the past 
15 years. The recent manifestation of violence experienced by dalit women is while asserting 
their political participation.154 
 Another report critiqued the lack of attention to vulnerability of disabled Dalit 
women.155 These observations were later been picked up by the CEDAW Committee 
in its concluding observations issued in respect of India in 2014, wherein it noted that: 
article 15 of the Constitution guarantees equal protection under the law for women and men 
and prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex. However the Committee is concerned at the 
absence of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law addressing all aspects of direct and 
indirect discrimination against women, and all the forms of intersectional discrimination, as 
explicitly listed in paragraph 18 of the Committee’s General Recommendation 28 (2010).156 
 In particular it expressed concern over: ‘the escalation of caste-based violence, 
including rape, against women and girls, and the downplaying by key State officials 
of the grave criminal nature of sexual violence against women and girls’157 and ‘Dalit 
women and women from scheduled tribes fac[ing] multiple barriers in accessing 
justice, due to legal illiteracy, lack of awareness of their rights, and limited 
accessibility of legal aid.’ 158  The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women,159  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 160  and the Human Rights 
Council161 have all independently examined and criticised Dalit women’s specific 
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vulnerabilities urging the government to strengthen law reform and enforcement on 
intersectional discrimination. A Human Rights Council Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Minority Issues detailed the impact of caste-based discrimination on 
the rights to religion, work, physical security and liberty, and health of Dalit women 
and recognised in particular that ‘Caste is one of the factors that result in multiple and 
intersecting forms of discrimination against certain groups of women. Women and 
girls from low castes are particularly vulnerable to violation and denial of their rights 
in both public and private life.’162 A joint statement of the UN Special Procedures on 
the ‘Continued Plight of the Untouchables’ has stressed that, ‘Dalit women and girls 
are particularly vulnerable and are exposed to multiple forms of discrimination and 
violence, including sexual violence, on the basis of gender and caste.’163  
 The biggest change in this form of engagement with the international women’s 
movement and human rights through CEDAW has been the recognition of differences 
amongst women, which in the early years of CEDAW were seen as either non-
existent or unimportant to the movement based on the assumption of commonality. 
Nussbaum recognises this assumption as one of the most salient contributions (in 
addition to the direct enforcement of CEDAW in cases like Vishaka) of CEDAW to 
the women’s movement. But it appears that, at least in the case of Dalit women, it was 
the supplanting of this assumption with accounts of differences which extended the 
potential of CEDAW to be able to relate to women who were not simply women but 
women who were intersectionally disadvantaged. The case of ‘dramatic jump in 
numbers’ in the attendance at the Beijing Conference is thus explained not simply by 
previous successes but rather a very new phenomena at the time that intersectional 
groups like Dalit women took to campaigning transnationally. They were though, not 
alone in this. As Joan McFarland explains, the Beijing Platform For Action was in 
fact considered rather insufficient in improving the conditions of women living in 
extreme poverty. Thus, she explains that: 
Indigenous women at Beijing…produced their own document because they felt that the 
Platform for Action did not sufficiently question the New World Order. They point out the 
lack of analysis in the Platform for Action, for example with reference to poverty [that the 
Platform For Action] ’does not acknowledge that this poverty is caused by the same powerful 
nations and interests who have colonized us and are continuing to recolonize, homogenize, 
and impose their economic growth development model and monocultures on us. It does not 
present a coherent analysis of why it is that the goals of “quality, development, and peace,” 
become more elusive to women each day in spite of three UN conferences on women since 
1975.’164 
 In fact the Indigenous Women’s document was clear in pointing out that the 
strategic objectives and actions outlined in the Platform for Action like women’s 
equal access and full participation in decision-making, equal status, equal pay, and 
integration and mainstreaming of gender perspectives and analysis were going to 
remain ‘hollow and meaningless if the inequality between nations, races, classes, and 
genders [were] not challenged at the same time.’165  Similarly, lesbians and queer 
women too made their distinct position well known at the Beijing Conference even 
                                                 
162 ibid. 
163 UN Special Procedures Joint Statement on the ‘Continued Plight of the Untouchables’ (May 2013) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?LangID=E&NewsID=13352> 
(accessed 12 October 2017). 
164 Joan McFarland, ‘From Feminism to Women's Human Rights: The Best Way Forward?’ (1998) 22 
Atlantis 50, 56. 
165  Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women [16] 
<http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/dec_beijing.html> (accessed 12 October 2017). 
 30 
though the word ‘sexual orientation’ appeared nowhere in the Platform for Action.166 
But it was in part to their campaigning that the document did recognise ‘women’s 
right to make sexual decisions free of coercion, discrimination, and violence and 
presents a starting point for future organizing around the UN.’167  
 In the final analysis, the disaggregated reading of the women’s movement 
through the lens of intersectional groups of Dalit women, indigenous women, and 
queer women, reveal how the women’s movement strengthened in their presence and 
drive to capitalise on CEDAW’s commitment to all women’s equality, not simply by 
relying on women’s common experiences but by mediating them with accounts of 
differences where necessary and relevant. In fact, beyond the ‘common purpose’ and 
‘common set of demands’ of women, these groups were able to use CEDAW to 
articulate their purpose and set of demands which were not only common with all 
women but also quite distinct from women who did not share their intersectional 
position. It is in this sense that I believe CEDAW has succeeded in supporting and 
strengthening women’s movement—giving a platform for articulating and addressing 
patterns of disadvantage which are not only gender-based and hence common 
between women, but relate to women in everyway based on their race, class, caste, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status, etc, and thus point to the 
crucial differences between women. The stuff of genuine solidarity in CEDAW 
appears to be one of commonality and difference, rather than the former alone. 
 
 4.2 Turning Limitations into Possibilities  
 
Whilst Nussbaum recounts CEDAW’s contribution to the women’s movement as 
largely positive, her analysis of CEDAW in relation to the issues of abortion, 
contraception, and sexual orientation is less so. Digging deeper into these issues again 
reveals a complicated view of how CEDAW has fared—at times in pointed and 
specific ways through its individual complaints and inquiry procedures in regards to 
women who suffer from intersectional disadvantage, rather than via broad 
proclamations for all women, say in general recommendations. The omission of the 
latter may then be less fatal than Nussbaum estimates in that the pointed responses 
within CEDAW jurisprudence through individual communications and inquiry 
procedure under the Optional Protocol can provide more robust responses to knotty 
issues than grand statements in the treaty or General Recommendations. Although one 
may not be a substitute for another, the presence of either should indicate possibilities 
and spaces in which CEDAW operates in more localised and hence effective ways, 
especially for women whose disadvantage has hitherto remained concealed and hence 
unattended.  
 For example, Nussbaum critiques the lack of clarity and stance of CEDAW on 
abortion and contraception. She finds not only the document, but also subsequent 
recommendations of the Committee to be wanting in these areas. This is one area 
where even though CEDAW may not have been able to make expressive progress of a 
general kind in its text or general recommendations, the CEDAW Committee has 
nevertheless been able to do justice in specific contexts and that too, intersectionally. 
The case of LC v Peru bears witness to this.168 The case involved a minor girl who 
had attempted suicide when she fell pregnant after repeated sexual abuse. She 
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survived but with major injuries which required immediate spinal surgery. Her 
surgery and the request to legally abort were declined by the hospital which 
concluded that her life was not in danger. By the time she had miscarried and 
underwent the required surgery, she was incapacitated from neck down. In these 
circumstances, the Committee found that the denial of abortion and surgery both 
constituted discrimination under CEDAW. While the only provision directly relevant 
to women’s reproductive rights—article 16(e) on women’s right to decide on the 
desired number of children—was decidedly inadequate in this situation, the 
Committee turned to the general right to health under article 12 to hold that the denial 
of abortion and spinal surgery disclosed a violation of that right.169 The Committee 
found that the denial was ‘even more serious considering that she was a minor and a 
victim of sexual abuse, as a result of which she attempted suicide.’170 The Committee 
also used article 5 of CEDAW to find that the decision of the hospital to postpone the 
surgery due to the pregnancy was based on an acceptable stereotype which valued 
women’s reproductive role and the protection of the foetus over the right to life, 
health and dignity of the mother. 171  Further, the Committee used the general 
obligations under article 2 to find that the lack of an established procedure by which 
women could access abortion constituted a violation of their right to access an 
effective remedy under article 2.172  
 Similarly, the Committee has used its sparingly invoked inquiry procedure to 
investigate grave or systemic violations under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to 
address concerns over artificial contraception in the specific context of Philippines.173 
The Committee issued its findings and recommendations in 2015 in relation to the 
Executive Orders No. 003 and 030 which regulated access to contraceptives in 
Manila. The Executive Order promoted natural family planning and discouraged 
artificial contraception, in particular, condoms, pills, intrauterine devices, surgical 
sterilization.174 Despite the fact that the contraceptives were not explicitly prohibited, 
the Committee found that the Executive Order had in effect lead to a city-wide 
depression in availability of and access to contraception. This was deemed to be in 
violation of women’s sexual and reproductive health rights. In particular, the 
Committee found that the ‘ban particularly harmed disadvantaged groups of women, 
including poor women, adolescent girls and women in abusive relationships.’ It 
systematically laid out the intersectional patterns of disadvantage afflicting women 
who belonged to these disadvantaged groups such that the denial of safe and 
affordable artificial contraception had particularly severe social, physical, and 
psychological consequences on them, in addition to intensifying their poverty.175 It 
concluded that the Philippines had violated its obligations under CEDAW and was 
responsible for grave and systematic violations of the rights under: article 12, read 
alone; article 12, read in conjunction with articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f), 5 and 10(h); and 
article 16(1)(e). The Committee issued extensive guidelines directing the Philippines 
to, amongst other things,  
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address the unmet need for contraception, especially in Manila, with a particular focus on 
economically disadvantaged women and adolescent girls, by ensuring universal and affordable 
access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, commodities and related 
information, which must include the availability of the safest and most technologically 
advanced methods of contraception, including oral contraception and emergency 
contraception, intrauterine devices and ligation services, and adequate provision in national 
and local government budgets for a sufficient supply of such contraceptive methods in all 
public health facilities, with a particular focus on local government units with low 
contraceptive prevalence rates176 
 The Philippines inquiry report is the most extensive statement of the CEDAW 
Committee in the matter of sexual and reproductive rights of women, especially in 
regards to artificial conception. While it does not constitute ‘general’ statements or 
‘universal’ affirmations on rights applicable to all CEDAW State Parties, it stands for 
an unambiguous inclusion of artificial contraception as part of the conspectus of 
rights under CEDAW in this context and thus by extension, hinting at the kind of 
conditions which can violate this right and its consequent obligations in other 
contexts. 
 In both LC v Peru and the Philippines inquiry, the Committee turned, what 
Nussbaum calls ‘utter silence about artificial contraception and abortion rights’,177 
into individual rights and enforceable obligations on the matter. It did so by 
interpreting the ‘too vague to lead to legal implementation’178 provision in article 
16(e), the general right to health under article 12, and the transformative obligations 
under article 5 in the specific context of abortion and contraception to create concrete 
legal rights and duties.  
 Nussbaum’s other area of concern is the neglected issue of sexual orientation 
in CEDAW. Nussbaum’s take on this seems to be that, while there has been an ‘utter 
failure’ in addressing issues of sexual orientation, the matter is nevertheless of 
‘longstanding controversy’ such that despite our theoretical or moral views on 
homosexuality, ‘there is still the strategic issue to consider’.179 The strategic issue is 
of addressing sexual orientation in the women’s movement and eventually 
jeopardising the movement since sexual orientation remains a contentious topic in 
many countries. Nussbaum thus asks: ‘Should a feminist in India, where sodomy is 
still a felony, taint her cause by this alliance?’180  
 Framing the inclusion of issues of sexual orientation in the women’s 
movement as a ‘strategic issue’ undermines the value of CEDAW as a uniform and 
inclusive turf (rather than a hierarchical basement) on which intersectional issues need 
not simply be included when they are ‘strategically’ viable but because without them 
the movement and women’s human rights remain theoretically deficient and un-
transformative. To recall, intersectionality expands the theoretical basis for what 
constitutes ‘discrimination’ or ‘sex discrimination’ by not only including experiences 
of those who are disadvantaged only as women but also those who belong to multiple 
disadvantaged groups at once, such a lesbian, bisexual, intersex or transsexual 
women, just as disabled, aged, minor, single, Dalit, Black and Roma women. By 
pointing out the specific nature of disadvantage suffered by intersectional groups, as 
both similar to yet different from discrimination suffered by women on the basis of 
sex alone, intersectionality imparts the key theoretical lesson that women’s 
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disadvantage cannot be solely construed in terms of commonalities based on sex or 
gender. It supplements commonality with the difference other identities or 
disadvantages make in the experience of sex or gender discrimination. 
Intersectionality thus enlarges our understanding of what women’s experiences really 
are, by representing the diversity of women and women’s lives and strengthening the 
assumptions around commonality by testing them in relation to intersectional groups. 
Construed this way, the exclusion of queer women in CEDAW is not simply a choice 
about strategy, i.e., of whether excluding them facially could make for a more 
successful women’s movement overall. Viewed in the light of intersectionality, the 
exclusion of queer women is a fundamentally inadequate construction of a women’s 
movement and human rights because it relies on a limited (inadequate) conception of 
women and women’s experiences. So by reducing the inclusion of intersectional 
groups to a mere question of strategy, Nussbaum misjudges the formative significance 
of intersectionality in understanding and addressing discrimination in women’s 
human rights. A formative understanding of intersectionality in the women’s 
movement and women’s human rights especially as incorporated in CEDAW, would 
make it unacceptable for queer women or other intersectional groups of women who 
are Black, Dalit, indigenous, disabled etc, to be passed over for others in the 
movement. Their substantive inclusion would be important for the movement for it 
would lack any theoretical coherence otherwise.  
 This is why even if Nussbaum is posing the question of whether the feminist 
movement must align with the queer movement as a matter of ‘strategic essentialism’, 
the question remains a problematic one. Going by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
understanding of strategic essentialism, intra-group differences can be set aside to 
create a base of commonality for grounding political movements. 181  Martha 
Minow,182 Tracy Higgins183 and Judith Butler184 similarly see the value in being able 
to build political coalitions based on commonness despite differences between 
women. And yet, strategic essentialism runs the danger of lapsing into essentialism 
when it stops critiquing its own reliance on theoretically unviable categories. 185 
Nussbaum’s consideration of her own question is one which gives more credence to 
the debate over the ‘unpopular cause’ of queer issues when ‘many feminists in the 
global context believe that homosexuality is immoral’.186 She no doubt acknowledges 
that in the exclusion of queer women from CEDAW ‘a price was paid, and possibly a 
type of coherence and integrity lost’, she does so by first acknowledging that still, the 
‘strategic point was huge’.187 Such a framing appears to be far from the kind of 
strategic essentialism deemed defensible, because it doubts the inclusion of queer 
women as part of the movement at all, and in fact goes for progress which excludes 
them, rather than eventually helping them through momentary exclusion of strategic 
essentialism. Thus, the defence of strategic essentialism cannot be raised when one 
fundamentally doubts a theoretically more inclusive enunciation of categories like 
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‘women’ or ‘sex discrimination’ and violation of ‘women’s human rights’, which is 
based on an appreciation of both commonalities and differences. One can only deploy 
strategic essentialism by appreciating not denying difference, because otherwise they 
are nothing but essentialising.  
 Eventually, the consequences of the choice Nussbaum poses with her question 
fall on women who are already marginalised, i.e. queer women, that they are excluded 
both theoretically and strategically from the women’s movement. Such a choice 
should not morally exist in a feminist discourse which aims to build solidarity on the 
ground of commonness and differences. Ignoring the differences and letting some fall 
by the wayside of the women’s movement does not solve the problems for queer 
women either substantively or strategically. 188  It is then not simply about being 
mindful of differences, but instead about treating them not as differences—
exceptional, stray, and removed from the mainstream or the collective—but as central 
to the conversation about how women’s human rights function on ground.  
 So issues of sexual orientation must appear more strongly in CEDAW and its 
jurisprudence not because they strategically make sense but because their exclusion 
chips away at the progress the movement makes. CEDAW may indeed have been 
silent on issues of sexual orientation and gender identity but there are some signs that 
CEDAW has provided a site for these issues to be asserted and addressed. Just like 
the development of CEDAW jurisprudence in relation to Dalit women and the 
intersectional position of women defined simultaneously by gender, caste and class, 
the development in relation to queer women too appears to be driven by networks of 
and NGOs representing queer women who have taken to the boomerang effect to 
argue for greater gender justice at home via CEDAW mechanisms like participating 
in the country reporting process through shadow reports. This is most visible in the 
shadow reports which are in turn taken up by the CEDAW Committee in its reports 
and concluding comments. 189 There is no doubt though, that there is much more work 
to be done. But possibilities for CEDAW to do so are being keenly explored,190 not 
only because there is any more resolution than there previously was about the 
morality of these issues or that they have become strategically viable. Rather, as this 
article has tried to show, CEDAW would fail in its transformative goals if it fails to 
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embrace intersectionality substantively, and thus attend to the situation of women by 
actually understanding the complex nature of international discrimination and 
violations suffered by women who belong to multiple disadvantaged groups, which 
isn’t always similar to disadvantage suffered by women on the basis of sex or gender 
alone. The argument for intersectionality is thus qualitative not simply strategic or 
even scalar in judging the transformative nature of the progress made under CEDAW. 
 The upshot of digging into issues which Nussbaum identified as ‘serious 
defects’, is that it is hard to judge the defects of CEDAW in a macro, acontextual 
way. The ambit of CEDAW has gone far beyond the text of the treaty itself and has 
been developed by the Committee under the Optional Protocol, in its reporting 
procedure and through the General Recommendations. The possibility of multi-
dimensional intervention has allowed the CEDAW Committee to contribute to the 
women’s movement and women’s human rights in particular contexts and in relation 
to particular groups which have demanded close attention. This has made CEDAW 
not only overcome its facial defects but transform cases of limitations into spaces of 
possibilities. But it requires a disparate and targeted reading of the vast jurisprudence 
created under CEDAW to be able to appreciate that: disparate as in looking into 
CEDAW’s multiple sites of intervention and targeted as in zooming in on certain 
issues and particular rights in question, contexts in which they operate, and the 
protectorate they affect the most.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the scheme of the basement metaphor, progress implies upward movement of those 
inhabiting the ceiling of the basement to the floor above. Transformation belies this 
linear trajectory. Transformation implies a complete overhaul which upturns the 
complex and stratified structure of the basement itself. It is thus intersectional in 
nature in that it touches the lives of all, not some, and especially those who suffer 
from several and severe forms of disadvantages associated with structures of racism, 
sexism, classism, casteism, ableism, ageism, homophobia, transphobia, etc. Does 
CEDAW believe in such transformation? Has it achieved it? That is, has it been able 
to invert systems of disadvantage and create a space of full equality and fulfilment of 
human rights for all women, including those who inhabit the depths of the basement 
and suffer from intersectional forms of violations? Or has its progress been partial and 
simplistic—touching the issues and lives of women who are relatively privileged, i.e. 
those who inhabit the ceiling?  
 This article has engaged with these questions in light of intersectionality 
theory, as applied to the position of Dalit women within the Dalit feminist discourse 
in India, and in response to Martha Nussbaum’s account of the progress of women’s 
human rights under CEDAW. Like Nussbaum, I found that women have made 
progress especially through CEDAW. But the progress that Nussbaum marked, 
seemed to belong to a certain cross-section of women not all of whom suffer from 
multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. It is thus not transformative in 
nature. This article argued for an assessment of women’s human rights and CEDAW 
through an intersectional lens such that what counts as progress in the women’s 
movement belongs to all women who suffer from discrimination not solely on the 
basis of gender but in everyway gender discrimination is experienced and intensified 
because of other forms of discrimination including that based on women’s race, 
colour, religion, caste, age, disability, sexual orientation, etc. Intersectionality is thus 
not only about who is included but also about the substantive issues which get 
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understood as and included in women’s issues. At its core, it reconfigures our 
understanding of the substantive content of women’s rights in relation to the actual 
violations, disadvantages, and deprivations women suffer.  
  CEDAW appears to have had a mixed record in appreciating this. Much of 
CEDAW’s success story is told through the lens of examples which have ignored 
intersectional discrimination and thus the transformative potential of CEDAW. The 
case of Vishaka which sidelined Bhanwari Devi and Dalit women, is symptomatic of 
this reading of women’s progress. Yet, over the years, CEDAW jurisprudence has 
grown to appreciate and address intersectional discrimination in the realisation of 
women’s human rights and has thus gone through an ‘intersectional transformation’ 
of sorts. The developments of the last decade in this regard, show immense promise in 
positing a vision and course for the radical reimagination of what women’s rights and 
women’s lives can be. It is these developments in relation to particular contexts and 
States and involving particular rights and forms of violations which have the potential 
to make a transformative breakthrough in women’s human rights through targeted 
intervention—via the General Recommendations, individual communications 
procedure and the inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol, and shadow 
reporting before the CEDAW Committee and other such transnational forms of 
campaigning. And it is this transformation of CEDAW which counts for 
transformative progress in the development of women’s human rights and the 
women’s movement and one that will in turn continue to provide the turf for struggles 
which are inclusive and ultimately successful.  
